

# Hardware Token Assurance for UCTrust

David Walker  
Office of the President  
University of California  
David.Walker @ ucop.edu

# Overview

- eAuthentication Context
  - OMB M-04-04 (and FIPS PUB 199)
  - NIST 800-63
- Implications for UCTrust
- Next Steps?

# OMB M-04-04 Criteria for Required Assurance Level

<b>Potential Impact Categories for Authentication Errors</b>	<b>Assurance Level Impact Profiles</b>			
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
Inconvenience, distress or damage to standing or reputation	Low	Mod	Mod	High
Financial loss or agency liability	Low	Mod	Mod	High
Harm to agency programs or public interests	N/A	Low	Mod	High
Unauthorized release of sensitive information (FIPS PUB 199)	N/A	Low	Mod	High
Personal safety	N/A	N/A	Low	Mod High
Civil or criminal violations	N/A	Low	Mod	High

# FIPS PUB 199 Confidentiality Impact Descriptions

	Low	Moderate	High
<b>Confidentiality</b> Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information. [44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]	The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a <b>limited</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a <b>serious</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.	The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a <b>severe or catastrophic</b> adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

(FIPS 199 also describes impacts for *Integrity* and *Availability*)

# NIST 800-63 (Selected) Criteria for Assurance Implementation

	Assurance Level Requirements			
	1	2	3	4
Hard crypto token (FIPS 140-2 Level 2)	x	x	x	x
1-time password device (FIPS 140-2 Level 1)	x	x	x	
Soft crypto token (FIPS 140-2 Level 1)	x	x	x	
Passwords & PINs	x	x		
Assertions acceptable	x	x	x	
Remote registration acceptable	x	x	x	
Number of ID's required	0	1	1	2

# Implications for UCTrust

- Level 3
  - New UCTrust Assurance profile, layered on *UCTrust Basic* (*UCTrust TwoFactor?*)
- Level 4
  - New UCTrust Assurance profile, layered on *UCTrust Basic* (and new Level 3 profile?)
  - A class of applications that do not use Shibboleth, and/or a “Level 4 Shibboleth” profile.

# Next Steps?

- What are the use cases?
- How do existing UC hardware tokens fit in?
- Potential activities
  - Define UCTrust assurance profiles
  - RFP for tokens (at different levels?)